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Abstract  
This paper studies the intangible costs of international trade by extending the basic gravity 
equation with measures of cultural and institutional distance, and institutional quality. 
Analyzing a sample of bilateral trade flows between 92 countries in 1999, we find that 
institutional distance has a negative effect on bilateral trade, presumably because the 
transaction costs of trade between partners from dissimilar institutional settings are high. In 
contrast, we find that cultural distance has a positive effect on bilateral trade. A potential 
explanation for this finding is that firms prefer trade to host-country production in culturally 
distant countries. Finally, we find that the institutional quality of both the importer and 
exporter increases the amount of bilateral trade. 
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1. Introduction 
Trade costs stemming from geographic distance and formal trade barriers are an important 
obstacle to international trade (Trefler, 1995; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). For a 
representative developed country, these costs may be as large as an ad-valorem tax-equivalent 
of 170% (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). However, observed trade costs do not fully 
explain international trade flows (Deardorff, 2004), as trade also involves unobserved costs 
stemming from cultural and institutional differences between countries. Because of these 
differences, firms have incomplete information about foreign markets and cultures, which 
causes additional trade costs related to information collection and contract negotiation and 
enforcement (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004; Berthelon and Freund, 2004; Hofstede, 
2001). 
In this paper, we empirically examine how cultural and institutional differences between 
countries and the institutional quality of the importer and exporter affect bilateral trade flows. 
By doing so, we complement previous empirical trade-flow research in several ways. First, 
we make an explicit conceptual and empirical distinction between cultural and institutional 
differences and examine their effects on bilateral trade flows simultaneously. Second, while 
previous research has typically used measures of cultural (un)familiarity, such as dummy 
variables indicating whether the trading partners share a common language, religion, and 
colonial past (e.g., Srivastava and Green, 1986; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; De Groot et 
al., 2004), we also include a measure of cultural (dis)similarity based on the well-established 
cultural framework of Hofstede (1980). This measure captures the extent of differences in 
norms and values between countries, and hence allows us to go beyond more traditional 
measures of cultural familiarity. Finally, while previous research has measured the 
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institutional dissimilarity between trading partners through a dummy variable indicating 
whether the partners had comparable governance quality levels (De Groot et al., 2004), we 
use a novel cardinal measure that captures the extent to which these quality levels differ.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the effects of 
cultural familiarity and similarity on bilateral trade, while section 3 discusses the effects of 
institutional quality and differences in institutional quality. Section 4 summarizes our research 
methodology, while section 5 reports our empirical findings. In section 6, we discuss these 
findings. Section 7 contains our concluding remarks. 
 
2. Culture and bilateral trade 
Many studies have extended the basic trade-flow gravity equation with dummy variables 
indicating whether the trading partners share a common language, religion, and colonial past 
(Geraci and Prewo, 1977; Srivastava and Green, 1986; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; 
Frankel and Rose, 2002; Yeyati, 2003; De Groot et al., 2004; Frankel, 1997; Boisso and 
Ferrantino, 1997; Guiso et al., 2004), with most of them finding that these variables have 
significantly positive effects on the magnitude of international trade flows. Although this 
indicates that these variables matter, they only capture cultural familiarity, in the sense that 
the trading partners will have more knowledge of each others culture and will find it easier to 
communicate and share information (Rauch, 1999; 2001). However, the fact that trading 
partners are familiar with each others culture does not mean that their cultures are similar. 
Cultural familiarity only requires acquaintance between cultures and perhaps some form of 
endorsement, while cultural similarity goes beyond acquaintance and acceptance, and requires 
shared norms and values.  
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We go beyond the level of cultural familiarity by focusing on the concept of cultural 
distance, which is defined as the extent to which the shared norms and values in one country 
differ from those in another (Hofstede, 2001; Kogut and Singh, 1988). It is generally 
acknowledged that a large cultural distance raises the costs of international trade, as large 
cultural differences make it difficult to understand, control, and predict the behavior of others 
(Elsass and Veiga, 1994), which complicates interactions (Parkhe, 1991), thus impeding the 
realization of business deals. Some of the most notable difficulties associated with cross-
cultural interaction include those associated with understanding, and particularly those 
associated with differences in perceptions of the same situation. Differences in perceptions 
complicate interactions, make them prone to fail, and hinder the development of rapport and 
trust – factors that generally facilitate the interaction process and lower the costs of trade 
(Neal, 1998). This suggests that a large cultural distance between countries reduces the 
amount of trade between them. 
The cultural distance between countries is usually assessed through Hofstede’s (1980) 
dimensions of national culture (e.g., Kogut and Singh, 1988; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997). 
Analyzing survey data obtained from 116,000 IBM employees in 40 countries, Hofstede 
identified four dimensions along which national cultures differ, namely:2  
1. Power distance, which refers to the extent to which people believe that power and status 
are distributed unequally and the extent to which they accept an unequal distribution of 
power as the proper way of organizing social systems. 
2. Uncertainty avoidance, which refers to the extent to which people are uncomfortable with 
uncertain, unknown, or unstructured situations. 
                                                 
2
  For the details of this analysis, we refer to Hofstede (1980). 
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3. Individualism vs. collectivism, which reflects the degree to which a society emphasizes 
the role of the individual as opposed to that of the group. 
4. Masculinity vs. femininity, which refers to the extent to which a society emphasizes 
traditional masculine values such as competitiveness, assertiveness, achievement, 
ambition, and the acquisition of money and other material possessions, as opposed to 
feminine values such as nurturing, helping others, putting relationships with people before 
money, not showing off, and minding the quality of life. 
 
Hofstede assigned each country a score on each cultural dimension that varied between about 
zero and 100 to indicate how people from different cultures feel about the above societal 
issues.3 Throughout the years, these scores have become available for an increasing number of 
countries. 
 
3. Institutions and bilateral trade 
Besides cultural differences, we also expect institutional factors to affect international trade 
flows (cf. Kostova, 1997). First, the quality of a country’s formal institutions, such as its legal 
system that enforces the rule of law and its legislature that imposes economic policies, to a 
large extent determines security in trade. The effectiveness of a country’s formal rules affects 
inter-personal trust and the ways of doing business. The enforcement of property rights and 
the adherence to trade contracts with foreign exporters varies significantly between countries 
                                                 
3
  Hofstede and Bond (1988) later uncovered a fifth cultural dimension, called ‘long-term orientation’. 
Unfortunately, the scores on this dimension are only available for a limited number of countries, thus reducing 
its empirical applicability. Moreover, scholars have questioned its added value, as it has been argued to reflect 
the same underlying cultural values as the individualism dimension (see Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997). 
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(Zhang et al., 2003), and environmental uncertainty can lead to frictions and conflicts 
between trading partners (Achrol et al., 1983; Skarmeas et al., 2002). Since international 
transactions move across jurisdictional boundaries, it is more difficult to enforce trade 
contracts in international than in domestic settings (Rodrik, 2000). Poorly developed 
institutions entail negative externalities for private transactions, which raises transaction costs 
and reduces international trade (Wei, 2000). If trade is supported by an effective rule of law, 
and if government regulation is transparent and impartial, countries engage in more trade 
(Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Jansen and Kyvik Nordas, 2004). We thus argue that the 
quality levels of the institutions of the importer and the exporter have a positive effect on the 
amount of trade between them. 
Moreover, aside from institutional quality, we expect bilateral differences in institutional 
quality to influence trade costs as well. A firm exporting to a foreign country with an 
institutional quality level comparable to that of the firm’s home country is likely to be better 
able to operate effectively in that country, as it does not incur large adjustment costs 
stemming from the unfamiliarity and the insecurity related to transaction contingencies in 
trade. Analyzing a sample of bilateral trade flows between more than 100 countries in 1998 
and including a dummy variable indicating whether the trading countries had similar levels of 
governance quality, De Groot et al. (2004) found that countries with comparable governance 
quality levels generally traded more. Hence, we expect the institutional distance between 
countries to have a negative effect on bilateral trade flows.  
The quality of a country’s institutions as well as institutional quality differences 
between countries can be assessed through Kaufmann et al.’s (2003) indicators of governance 
quality (e.g., Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). Based on an unobserved components analysis of 
several hundreds of variables measuring perceptions of governance drawn from 25 sources 
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constructed by 18 organizations such as BERI, Euromoney, and the World Bank, Kaufmann 
et al. (2003) identified six dimensions of governance infrastructure quality along which 
countries differ, namely:  
1. Voice and Accountability, which reflects the extent to which a country’s citizens are able 
to participate in  the selection of governments, as well as the extent to which these 
governments are monitored and can be held accountable for their actions. 
2. Political stability, which measures the likelihood that a country’s government will be 
overthrown through unconstitutional interference, such as domestic violence or terrorism.  
3. Government effectiveness, which reflects the extent to which the government is able to 
formulate and implement good policies and deliver public goods. It focuses on the quality 
of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil 
servants, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. 
4. Regulatory quality, which measures the quality of the actual policies, like the degree of 
regulation of foreign trade and the incidence of market-unfriendly policies. 
5. Rule of law, which measures the degree to which a country’s citizens have confidence in 
the law and abide by the rules of society. It concentrates on the quality of the legal system 
and the enforceability of contracts. 
6. Control of corruption, which reflects the degree to which public power is exercised for 
private gain. 
 
4. Methodology 
In order to assess the impact of cultural distance and institutions on trade flows, we use a 
gravity model that controls for other variables influencing the amount of trade between pairs 
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of countries. The basic gravity model relates the amount of bilateral trade between two 
countries to their economic size (reflected by their GDPs) and the geographic distance 
between them. The model has long been used to analyze international trade patterns (for an 
overview, see Frankel, 1997), and has always been successful in providing economically and 
statistically significant results, while explaining most variation in bilateral trade (Rose, 2005). 
Although frequently criticized for its lack of a theoretical foundation, Anderson (1979) 
initiated a series of studies that successfully addressed the relation between economic theory 
and the gravity model (Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Deardorff, 1998; Evenett and Keller, 
2002; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003 and 2004). 
Our empirical approach closely follows the arguments in the two previous sections. 
First, following Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) and Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), among 
others, we extend the basic gravity equation with variables reflecting cultural familiarity. 
Specifically, we include dummies indicating whether the trading partners share a common 
language, colonial past, or common religion. In the second stage we include our measures of 
cultural distance, institutional distance and institutional quality. Finally, we include some 
additional control variables and country-specific fixed effects to check the robustness of our 
results. The specification of the full gravity equation in our analysis is as follows: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) log( )ij i j i j ij ij
ij ij ij ij ij ij i j ij
T Y Y y y D Adj
RIA Lan Col Rel CD ID IQ IQ
β β β β β β β
β β β β β β β β ε
= + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + +
 (1) 
 
where i and j denote the exporting and importing country, respectively. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of bilateral merchandise exports (Tij) in thousands of U.S. 
dollars from country i to j in 1999. The basic explanatory variables are the logs of i and j’s 
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GDPs (Yi and Yj, respectively), their GDPs per capita (yi and yj, respectively), and their 
geographic distance (Dij), and two dummies reflecting whether i and j are adjacent countries 
(Adj), or share membership in a regional integration agreement (RIAij). These seven variables 
form our basic gravity equation. In addition, we include three dummies taking the value of 1 
if country i and j share a primary language (Lanij), colonial history (Colij), and main religion 
(Relij), respectively, so as to capture i and j’s cultural familiarity. Our variables of interest are 
indicators of country i and j’s cultural (CDij) and institutional (IDij) distance, and their 
institutional quality (IQi and IQj, respectively). We have complete data on all explanatory 
variables for 92 countries (see Table A1). 
The bilateral trade data are taken from the United Nations’ COMTRADE database, and 
were accessed through the World Bank’s WITS integrated database. The GDP and GDP per 
capita data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. All these data are 
for 1999. We use the country scores on Hofstede’s (1980; 2001) four dimensions of national 
culture to construct the following cultural distance measure: 
( )
=
−=
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1 /
c
ccjciij VCCCD         (2) 
where Cci indicates country i’s score on Hofstede’s cth dimension and Vc the variance of this 
dimension across all countries. This measure was developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) and 
is often used in international business research (e.g., Loree and Guisinger, 1995; Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1997; Park and Ungson, 1997; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001). 
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Our measures of institutional quality (IQ) and institutional distance (ID) are based on the 
1998 scores on Kaufmann et al.’s (2003) six dimensions of governance infrastructure quality.4 
We measure a country’s institutional quality by the arithmetic average of the country’s scores 
on all six governance dimensions, since these dimensions are highly correlated. The 
institutional distance between country pairs is measured in the same way as their cultural 
distance, i.e. through Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index: 
 ( )
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−==
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where Iki indicates country i’s score on Kaufmann et al.’s kth dimension and Vk the variance 
of this dimension across all countries. For a detailed description of the other variables 
included in the gravity equation and their data sources, we refer to the appendix. 
 
5.  Results 
Model 1 in Table 1 depicts the results for the basic gravity equation. It shows that, in line with 
previous findings, the importer’s and exporter’s GDP and GDP per capita have positive 
effects on the amount of trade between them, while geographic distance has a negative effect. 
Furthermore, adjacent countries trade substantially more than non-contiguous countries (i.e., 
153%), confirming the importance of proximity for trade,5 while membership in a common 
regional integration agreement substantially raises bilateral trade as well. Models 2, 3, and 4 
in Table 1 extend the basic gravity equation with measures of cultural familiarity. We 
                                                 
4
  These scores are available for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. Since our bilateral trade data refer to 1999, 
we decided to use the 1998 scores. 
5
  The percentage trade impact for dummy variable j can be computed as follows: ( )1 100%jeβ − × . 
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successively add dummies indicating whether the trading partners have a common language, 
colonial link, and common religion.  
 
Table 1. Gravity estimates: benchmark gravity model extended with cultural familiarity 
variables  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Standard model Common language Colonial links Common main 
religion 
Log GDP exporter 1.18*** 1.19*** 1.19*** 1.19*** 
 (77.55) (78.38) (78.69) (78.72) 
Log GDP importer 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 
 (59.08) (59.76) (60.52) (60.54) 
Log GDP/cap exporter 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 
 (4.22) (4.43) (4.55) (4.27) 
Log GDP/cap importer 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (3.55) (3.69) (3.80) (3.59) 
Log Distance –1.03*** –1.03*** –1.05*** –1.05*** 
 (40.89) (41.49) (42.16) (42.14) 
Adjacent countries 0.93*** 0.76*** 0.77*** 0.74*** 
 (6.57) (5.27) (5.30) (5.08) 
RIA dummy 0.74*** 0.61*** 0.55*** 0.53*** 
 (10.99) (9.33) (8.54) (8.15) 
Language dummy  1.09*** 0.38*** 0.28** 
  (14.23) (3.52) (2.56) 
Colonial link dummy   0.98*** 0.98*** 
   (10.42) (10.42) 
Religion dummy    0.20*** 
    (3.77) 
Constant –35.84*** –36.17*** –36.25*** –36.24*** 
 (73.38) (74.81) (75.06) (75.08) 
Observations 7819 7819 7819 7819 
Adjusted R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73 
F-statistic 2636.48 2339.87 2099.81 1891.17 
Note: robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent 
variable: log of aggregate bilateral export. 
 
The results indicate that country pairs with a similar official language, religion, and colonial 
past trade more, presumably because these cultural and historical links increase the extent to 
which countries are familiar with each other. Model 4 shows that the effects of similarity in 
language, religion, and colonial past remain significantly positive when these variables are 
jointly entered. However, the effect size and statistical significance of the language dummy 
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decrease substantially once we control for colonial links, reflecting that countries sharing their 
primary language often used to have colonial links as well. Adding the common religion 
dummy results in a similar change in the effect of language commonality, although to a 
somewhat lesser extent.  
To assess and compare the economic impact of the explanatory variables, we calculated 
their quantitative contributions to the variation in trade flows. The first column in Table 2 
presents the standardized beta coefficient, jxB , for each regressor jx (see, e.g., Helpman et al., 
2004). This coefficient is defined as: 
%100
)log(
×
σ
σ×β
=
ij
j
j
T
xj
xB   (4) 
It reflects the average variation in trade flows generated by the regressor, relative to the total 
average variation in trade flows (as measured by the standard deviation in the log of trade 
flows, )log( ijTσ ). The average variation in trade flows caused by the variation in regressor jx  
is computed by multiplying the parameter estimate (βj) by the standard deviation of the 
regressor ( jxσ ). Apart from the relative importance of each explanatory variable in 
explaining the variation in trade flows, we are also interested in their absolute effects. The 
trade impact of the log-linear variables in the gravity model (i.e., the four GDP variables and 
geographic distance) can be inferred directly from Table 1, as their parameter estimates reflect 
the elasticity of trade with respect to changes in these variables. The second column of table 2 
depicts the trade impact of the dummy variables, measured as the percentage change in 
bilateral trade when countries have a common characteristic, relative to the situation where 
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they do not have the characteristic in common. Table 2 shows that most of the variation in 
trade flows is explained by variations in GDP and geographic distance across countries. 
Although countries sharing borders or a colonial past trade substantially more, these factors 
account for only a relatively small part of the total variation in trade.6 
 
Table 2. Trade effects: A quantitative illustration. 
Based on Specification 4 of Table 1 Beta-coefficient (%) Trade impact if Dummy=1 (%) 
Log GDP exporter 63 – 
Log GDP importer 50 – 
Log GDP/cap exporter 3 – 
Log GDP/cap importer 3 – 
Log Distance 26 – 
Adjacent countries 3 110 
RIA dummy 4 70 
Language Dummy 2 32 
Colonial link Dummy 8 166 
Religion Dummy 2 22 
Note: beta-coefficients are defined as the parameter estimate times the standard deviation of the regressor, 
relative to the standard deviation in trade (see equation 4). 
 
Table 3 extends the gravity model with our variables of interest, i.e. the indicators of 
institutional quality, and institutional and cultural distance. Surprisingly, the effect of cultural 
distance on trade is significantly positive, indicating that culturally-dissimilar countries trade 
more rather than less. This result is robust to controlling for institutional factors. The results 
also show that the quality of the importer’s and exporter’s institutions have positive effects on 
the amount of trade, presumably because high-quality institutions enhance property security 
                                                 
6
  Apart from the effect size estimate, the variance of the regressors is also important for the variation in 
trade that they explain. For dummy variables, this implies that the shares of 0 and 1 observations in the sample 
become important for their economic significance in explaining the variation in trade patterns. This explains why 
the beta-coefficient for the regional bloc effect is higher than that for contiguity, even though the former’s 
estimated effect size is smaller. 
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and contract enforceability, and reduce the costs of trade. Institutional distance is negatively 
related to bilateral trade. This illustrates that traders incur additional transaction costs if they 
are not familiar with the institutional environment of their foreign trading partners. 
Table 3. Gravity equations: cultural distance and institutions.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cultural distance Institutional 
distance 
Institutional 
quality 
Excluding cultural 
familiarity 
controls 
Log GDP exporter 1.19*** 1.19*** 1.21*** 1.20*** 
 (78.79) (78.99) (78.90) (77.96) 
Log GDP importer 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.95*** 
 (60.75) (60.61) (61.08) (59.85) 
Log GDP/cap exporter 0.06*** 0.06*** –0.16*** –0.19*** 
 (3.23) (3.19) (4.39) (5.24) 
Log GDP/cap importer 0.05*** 0.05*** –0.06* –0.09** 
 (2.74) (2.68) (1.68) (2.55) 
Log Distance –1.06*** –1.06*** –1.07*** –1.05*** 
 (42.26) (42.35) (42.68) (41.49) 
Adjacent countries 0.76*** 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.95*** 
 (5.23) (5.10) (5.23) (6.60) 
RIA dummy 0.54*** 0.51*** 0.44*** 0.63*** 
 (8.28) (7.62) (6.71) (9.16) 
Language dummy 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.32***  
 (2.78) (2.82) (2.87)  
Colonial link dummy 0.98*** 0.99*** 0.90***  
 (10.45) (10.47) (9.52)  
Religion dummy 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.22***  
 (4.22) (4.10) (4.03)  
Cultural distance 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.02 
 (4.30) (5.01) (3.53) (1.21) 
Institutional distance  –0.03*** –0.03*** –0.03** 
  (2.90) (2.86) (2.45) 
Inst. quality exporter   0.43*** 0.52*** 
   (7.55) (8.88) 
Inst. quality importer   0.23*** 0.31*** 
   (4.14) (5.53) 
Constant –36.09*** –36.13*** –34.21*** –33.44*** 
 (74.91) (75.11) (63.87) (61.95) 
Observations 7819 7819 7819 7819 
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72 
F-statistic 1733.08 1597.79 1351.08 1667.58 
Note: robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% . 
Dependent variable: log aggregate bilateral export. 
 
Except for GDP per capita, the basic gravity variables are robust to the inclusion of 
institutional quality, and cultural and institutional distance. The fact that the effect of GDP per 
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capita becomes negative in model 3 and 4 suggests that the earlier gravity equations suffer 
from omitted variables bias with respect to institutional quality (Anderson and Marcouiller, 
2002). Specifically, once we control for institutional quality, the effect of GDP per capita may 
reflect a structural feature of (wealthier) countries. As the share of services in output and 
expenditures increases with the level of economic development (Chenery, 1960), the share of 
expenditures on traded merchandise decreases with a country’s GDP per capita. 
The effects of the cultural familiarity variables remain significantly positive. Apparently, 
language and colonial ties, religious similarities and cultural distance all reflect distinct 
channels through which culture affects trade patterns, suggesting that cultural familiarity and 
cultural similarity are different concepts. However, model 4 shows that the cultural familiarity 
variables strengthen the effect of cultural distance in terms of size and statistical significance, 
indicating that the two concepts are related. This is intuitively clear, as cultural familiarity is 
likely to be negatively associated with cultural distance. The correlation between the cultural 
familiarity variables and cultural distance leads to omitted variable bias if either type of 
culture variables is excluded from the model.  
Table 4 quantifies the trade effects for the full gravity model, i.e. model 3 in Table 3. 
The variation in trade flows accounted for by the average variation in cultural and institutional 
distance, and in institutional quality is between 2 and 10 percent. The variation in trade 
explained by cultural distance is approximately the same as that explained by common 
language, religion and adjacency, but is only about one fourth of the variation explained by a 
shared colonial history. To the extent that a common language and religion, and a colonial 
history reflect cultural familiarity, this suggests that cultural familiarity accounts for more 
variation in trade flows than cultural distance.  
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Table 4. Trade effects: quantitative illustration. 
Based on Specification 3 of Table 3 Beta-coefficient (%) Trade impact if Dummy=1 (%) 
Log GDP exporter 64 – 
Log GDP importer 51 – 
Log GDP/cap exporter 7 – 
Log GDP/cap importer 3 – 
Log Distance 26 – 
Adjacent countries 3 116 
RIA dummy 3 55 
Language Dummy 2 38 
Colonial link Dummy 8 146 
Religion Dummy 2 25 
Cultural distance 2 – 
Institutional distance 2 – 
Institutional quality exporter 10 – 
Institutional quality importer 5 – 
Note: beta-coefficients are defined as the parameter estimate times the standard deviation of the regressor, 
relative to the standard deviation in trade. 
 
Sensitivity analyses  
To test the robustness of our results, Table 5 adds several variables capturing geographic 
characteristics of the trading countries to the full gravity model, i.e. to model 3 in Table 3. 
Following Raballand (2003) and Rose (2004), among others, models 1 to 4 add the log of the 
product of the surface areas of the trading partners and four dummy variables indicating 
whether the partners are landlocked or island nations. These variables capture transport cost 
margins in trade and, ultimately, cross-country productivity differences (Gallup et al., 1999). 
In particular, because land and air transport of especially bulk goods is often more expensive 
than water transport (Frankel, 1997), country pairs with a large combined surface area and 
landlocked countries incur higher transport costs, while island nations incur lower transport 
costs. The results of model 1 to 4 support this view. The effects of the institutional and 
cultural variables remain the same, although the size of their parameter estimates differs 
somewhat across the various models. 
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Table 5. Gravity estimates: robustness to geographical factors and country-specific 
effects  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Surface area Landlocked-ness Islands all geographical 
controls 
Log GDP exporter 1.28*** 1.19*** 1.22*** 1.27*** 
 (65.01) (77.10) (76.53) (62.91) 
Log GDP importer 1.03*** 0.94*** 0.97*** 1.01*** 
 (51.08) (60.00) (58.28) (49.36) 
Log GDP/cap exp. –0.24*** –0.23*** –0.17*** –0.32*** 
 (6.23) (6.47) (4.73) (8.41) 
Log GDP/cap imp. –0.14*** –0.14*** –0.07** –0.23*** 
 (3.71) (4.06) (1.97) (6.03) 
Log Distance –1.05*** –1.11*** –1.09*** –1.10*** 
 (41.29) (44.37) (42.58) (42.37) 
Adjacent countries 0.82*** 0.80*** 0.77*** 0.85*** 
 (5.49) (5.40) (5.18) (5.66) 
RIA dummy 0.46*** 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 
 (7.07) (6.26) (6.59) (6.59) 
Language dummy 0.37*** 0.27** 0.32*** 0.33*** 
 (3.37) (2.48) (2.85) (3.00) 
Colonial link dummy 0.86*** 0.78*** 0.84*** 0.72*** 
 (9.12) (8.25) (8.86) (7.65) 
Religion dummy 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 
 (4.14) (4.77) (4.11) (4.91) 
Cultural distance 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 (3.51) (3.97) (3.26) (3.91) 
Institutional distance –0.03*** –0.03** –0.03*** –0.02** 
 (2.82) (2.40) (2.73) (2.33) 
Inst. quality exporter 0.44*** 0.58*** 0.43*** 0.58*** 
 (7.64) (9.83) (7.54) (9.87) 
Inst. quality importer 0.23*** 0.39*** 0.23*** 0.40*** 
 (4.24) (6.77) (4.15) (6.89) 
Log area-product –0.07***   –0.08*** 
 (6.30)   (6.62) 
Landlocked exporter  –0.57***  –0.57*** 
  (7.68)  (7.55) 
Landlocked importer  –0.64***  –0.65*** 
  (8.77)  (8.81) 
Island exporter   0.33*** 0.12 
   (2.90) (1.05) 
Island importer   0.25** 0.01 
   (2.44) (0.14) 
Constant –34.88*** –31.36*** –34.57*** –32.12*** 
 (62.60) (55.45) (63.41) (54.06) 
Observations 7819 7819 7819 7819 
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.74 
F-statistic 1253.87 1203.47 1175.63 1006.21 
Notes: robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable: log aggregate bilateral export. 
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6.  Discussion 
Although the effects of institutional quality and institutional distance on bilateral trade flows 
are generally as expected, this is not the case for the effect of cultural distance, as we find it to 
be positive rather than negative. The different costs associated with serving foreign markets in 
different ways may provide an explanation for this counterintuitive finding. There are two 
ways in which firms can serve foreign markets: they can export their products, i.e. produce 
them at home and sell them (or have them sold) abroad, or they can produce and sell them 
locally, i.e. in the host country (Caves, 1996). The international business literature argues that 
although the costs of export are likely to increase with cultural distance, the costs of local 
production are likely to increase even faster, because, compared to trade, local production 
requires closer interactions with a wider variety of local stakeholders such as employees, 
unions, suppliers, and government agencies (Hennart, 2000; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). 
Moreover, the larger the cultural distance between two countries, the larger the differences in 
their organizational and management practices (Kogut and Singh, 1988). These differences 
make the transfer of home-country practices to production subsidiaries located in culturally 
dissimilar environments difficult and costly (Gómez-Meija and Palich, 1997). 
Because of the high costs and uncertainty of successfully operating production facilities 
in culturally distant countries, firms expanding into such countries tend to opt for entry modes 
requiring relatively little resources, such as exporting (Dunning, 1993). Firms are generally 
unwilling to commit substantial resources to production subsidiaries located in culturally 
distant markets, as this would substantially reduce their ability to withdraw from the market 
should the venture turn out to be unsuccessful (Hill et al., 1990). Furthermore, since managers 
are usually not familiar, comfortable, or even in agreement with the values, behaviors and 
practices of cultures that are truly foreign to them, they perceive a higher level of uncertainty 
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when entering culturally distant countries (Caves, 1996), leading them to avoid high-
commitment entry modes (Root, 1998). 
Thus, the positive effect of cultural distance on trade may be explained by the fact that 
although the costs of trade increase with cultural distance, those of host-country production 
increase even more, leading firms to prefer trade over host-country production. In order for 
bilateral exports to increase with cultural distance, the substitution effect of host-country 
production by trade has to be large enough to compensate the decrease in exports by firms not 
engaged in host-country production. An explicit examination of the existence of this 
substitution effect would require data on the sales of firms’ foreign production affiliates, but 
unfortunately these are not readily available for the large majority of countries included in our 
sample. 
Our finding that the impact of institutional distance on bilateral trade flows is negative 
suggests that the substitution effect described above does not exist for institutional 
differences. This indicates that the costs of trade increase equally fast with institutional 
distance as those of host-country production, presumably because foreign exporters are to the 
same extent faced with the idiosyncratic institutions of their target countries as foreign firms 
producing and selling their goods locally in these countries. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
This paper examines the effects of cultural and institutional variables on the amount of 
bilateral trade between 92 countries. Acknowledging that previous studies have addressed the 
role of a shared language, colonial past, and religion in otherwise standard gravity models, we 
argue that these variables only capture cultural familiarity. Using Hofstede’s (1980) four 
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dimensions of national culture, we also analyze the effect on bilateral trade of cultural 
distance, reflecting differences in cultural values and norms. In addition, we estimate the 
impact on trade of the quality of the institutions of the importing and exporting countries, as 
well as the impact of bilateral differences in institutional quality, using Kaufmann et al.’s 
(2003) dimensions of governance quality. We find that the institutional quality of both the 
importer and exporter has a positive effect on the amount of trade between them. We also find 
that institutional distance has a negative effect on bilateral trade flows, while cultural distance 
has a positive effect. The international business literature suggests that this is because firms 
prefer trade to host-country production in culturally distant countries, but further research is 
required to substantiate this claim. 
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 Table A.1. Countries included in the sample 
 1 Albania 
 2 Argentina 
 3 Armenia 
 4 Australia 
 5 Austria 
 6 Azerbaijan 
 7 Belgium 
 8 Bhutan 
 9 Brazil 
10 Bulgaria 
11 Burkina Faso 
12 Canada 
13 Chile 
14 China 
15 Colombia 
16 Costa Rica 
17 Croatia 
18 Czech republic 
19 Denmark 
20 Dom Republic 
21 Ecuador 
22 Egypt 
23 El Salvador 
24 Estonia 
25 Ethiopia 
26 Finland  
27 France 
28 Georgia 
29 Germany 
30 Ghana 
31 Greece 
32 Guatemala 
33 Hong Kong  
34 Hungary 
35 India 
36 Indonesia 
37 Iran 
38 Ireland  
39 Israel 
40 Italy 
41 Jamaica 
42 Japan  
43 Jordan 
44 Kenya 
45 Kuwait 
46 Latvia 
47 Lebanon 
48 Lithuania 
49 Luxembourg 
50 Malawi 
51 Malaysia 
52 Malta 
53 Mexico 
54 Morocco 
55 Nepal 
56 Netherlands 
57 New Zealand 
58 Nigeria 
59 Norway 
60 Pakistan 
61 Panama 
62 Peru 
63 Philippines 
64 Poland 
65 Portugal 
66 Rumania 
67 Russia 
68 Saudi Arabia 
69 Singapore 
70 Slovakia 
71 Slovenia 
72 South Africa 
73 South Korea 
74 Spain 
75 Sri Lanka 
76 Surinam 
77 Sweden 
78 Switzerland 
79 Syria 
80 Tanzania 
81 Thailand 
82 Trinidad 
83 Turkey 
84 Ukraine 
85 United Kingdom 
86 United States 
87 Uruguay 
88 Venezuela 
89 Vietnam 
90 Yemen 
91 Yugoslavia 
92 Zambia 
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Appendix. Data description 
Apart from the institutional and cultural indicators that were already discussed at length in de 
main text, we use both country-specific and bilateral data from various sources in our 
empirical analyses. The GDPs of the exporting and importing countries are examples of 
country-specific variables, while geographic distance, adjacency, and common language and 
religion, among others, are examples of bilateral characteristics that we take into account for 
each pair of countries. Below we will describe our data and sources in more detail. 
 
• The dependent variable is the log of the amount of bilateral merchandise exports, which 
results in two observations for each country pair, i.e. the export flows from country i to j, 
and those from j to i. These data come from the United Nations’ COMTRADE database 
for bilateral trade flows and refer to 1999. We use reported imports rather than reported 
exports, because the former provides a better coverage. We use mirror import flows that 
correspond to the export flows.  
• The source of the GDP and GDP per capita data is the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2000 - on CD Rom). Both GDPs are in constant U.S. dollars at 1995 prices 
and refer to 1999.  
• The data on geographic distance, common border, common official language, common 
regional trade agreement, common dominant religion and common colonial history come 
from various sources, and have kindly been made available on the internet by several 
researchers and research institutes. Specifically, we use OECD data for regional 
integration agreements, Sala-i-Martin’s (1997)7 database for religions and colonial 
backgrounds, and Jon Haveman’s International Trade Data8 for distance, contiguity and 
language. This part of our database is available upon request from the corresponding 
author. Some remarks on these variables are: 
o In line with previous research, we measure the geographic distance between two 
countries as the straight line distance between their capitals. This measure is likely to 
overestimate the distance of trade, although this overestimation is larger for 
                                                 
7
  See http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/data.htm. 
8
  See http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/trade.resources/tradedata.html#gravity. 
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neighboring countries than for those located far away from each other. For a 
discussion on the use and usefulness of other, more sophisticated measures of 
geographic distance, we refer to Frankel (1997, chapter 4). In general, more 
sophisticated geographic distance measures produce similar results, and cannot 
eliminate the measurement error for contiguous countries. 
o The common border dummy takes the value of one if two countries are adjacent. 
Adjacency requires either a land border or a small body of water as a border. This 
variable captures the effect of historical relations between adjacent countries as well as 
the measurement error in the distance variable. 
o We use OECD data on major regional integration agreements (RIAs) to determine 
whether pairs of countries take part in a particular RIA.9 We created a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if both countries take part in the same RIA. 
o To assess whether two countries have the same official language, we use the fourteen 
languages distinguished by Jon Haveman, i.e. Arabic, Burmese, Chinese, Dutch, 
English, French, German, Greek, Korean, Malay, Persian, Portuguese, Spanish and 
Swedish. We used CIA’s World Factbook to extend the number of countries and 
languages10. In case none of the above applied and no further language data were 
available, countries were assigned to the categories ‘other language’ or ‘non 
available’. The dummy variable reflects whether or not two countries have at least one 
official language in common. 
o Cultural and/or historical ties between countries may also consist of a common 
dominant religion or a shared colonial past. Data for these variables come from Sala-i-
Martin (1997). Using the percentage of the population adhering to one of seven major 
religions (i.e., Buddhism, Catholicism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Jewish religion, 
Islam, and Protestantism), he assigned country pairs a value of 1 if their dominant 
religion is the same. For some countries, two religions were equally dominant over the 
others. In these cases, both religions were considered to be the dominant ones.  
o The dummy variable common colony reflects whether country pairs share a colonial 
history. The data consider the British, French and Spanish empires only. In contrast to 
                                                 
 
9
  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/37/1923431.pdf 
10
  See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
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the original data source, we also include these colonizers themselves into the 
respective empires. In this way, the figures identify shared colonial relations for pairs 
of countries. 
• We include several other geographical variables as well. In sum: 
o The data on island nations have kindly been made available by Hildegunn Kyvik 
Nordas (from Jansen and Kyvik Nordas, 2004). We created a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the exporting country is an island. A second dummy indicates 
whether or not the importing country is an island. 
o We collected the data on landlocked countries and land areas from the CEPII gravity 
database.11 A separate dummy for landlocked countries is included on the export and 
import side. Land area is measured in square kilometers. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
  See http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
